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1 Introduction and Central Research Questions
Since 1989, the study of transformation processes of centrally planned economies
has emerged as an important research topic in the social sciences. Interdisciplinary
research approaches are imperative in this arena. Transformation processes are
complex; social, political, and economic issues are closely intertwined. In order to
generate comprehensive and useful knowledge about the determinants and
dynamics of such transformation processes, researchers need to combine a variety
of theoretical and methodological approaches.
The restructuring and modernization of socialist factory towns – cities that featured
just one single large employer – is a prime example of the general intricacy of
economic, political, and social change processes in Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union. To a significant extent, production in these countries was organized in
so-called Kombinate – vast integrated production conglomerates which were the
principal organizational units of the socialist economy. Kombinate were groups of
state-owned companies (VEB). They were either involved in the production of
similar goods and services (horizontal integration). Or, each unit of the Kombinat
produced intermediate goods and services which were then used to produce the
end-product (vertical integration). Kombinate were not only the main employers in
the socialist economy. They were also responsible for providing a wide range of
local services, including energy delivery, schooling, and other social services. The
collapse of a Kombinat automatically also meant the complete disintegration of the
economic structures of a factory town, with large-scale social and political fallout for
an entire region. As a result, the successful modernization and restructuring of these
socialist conglomerates had a special significance for the overall transformation of
formerly socialist political economies.
Factory towns all across the Comecon block shared a number of basic structural
features. For example, all of them were important regional economic growth centers.
Yet, at the same time, the extreme level of industrial integration made economic
diversification in the surrounding region virtually impossible. In contrast to Henry
Ford’s principle to divide the production process into different components (planning,
organization of production, and engineering), the socialist planners aspired to create
closed production cycles.1
Factory towns in socialist economies were also plagued by a number of common
problems. Various empirical studies have shown that the nature of socialist planning
and economic organization almost always resulted in under-investment in productive
infrastructure (fixed assets). As long as the Kombinate produced according to “plan”
(i.e., they produced a certain level of output determined in the centrally determined
economic 5-year-plan), investment in capital goods was largely ignored. As a
consequence, the lack of investment in capital goods over time resulted in
outmoded and increasingly inefficient production facilities. Consequently, the inter-
                                                 
1 See Röhl (2001), p. 10.
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national competitiveness of the Kombinate deteriorated steadily. Accordingly, it was
almost impossible for socialist states to sell goods on Western markets, due to
deficiencies in design, usability, and quality. Inefficient production, typically over-
sized production facilities, as well as a very low degree of division of labor generated
suboptimal economic results. The lack of investment in capital goods also meant
that in some Kombinate up to 30 percent of the employed labor force was involved
in repair work rather than production. Dated production methods completed this
rather grim picture.2
The East German economy is a very helpful and instructive example for analyzing
best (and worst) practices in restructuring and modernization processes of socialist
factory towns more generally. Amongst the economies in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, East Germany was the poster child of socialist monopolization. In
1989, roughly 90 percent of the East German labor force was employed in 2,170
Kombinate. As a result, the principal challenge policymakers faced after 1989 was to
transform these conglomerates into competitive firms fit to sustain the rough winds
of the western-style market economy. For the numerous East German factory
towns, this was a question not only of economic restructuring and reform – it was a
question of mere survival.3
What are the lessons learned from the East German experience? What is best, what
is worst practice in managing such a broad-based transformation processes? This
study seeks to provide at least some preliminary answers to these questions. The
study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses some of the unique features of the
East German transformation process. Chapter 3 analyzes case studies of factory
towns in the former GDR, and the ways in which the modernization and restructuring
processes were managed. On the basis of these case studies, general propositions
regarding successful transformation processes are formulated in chapter 4. Chapter
5 concludes.
The case studies and the resulting propositions demonstrate very clearly that
successful transformation processes do not just require careful privatization
schemes. Successful transformation processes also critically depend on supporting
macroeconomic policies as well as suitable regional development strategies. Yet,
before delving into further analysis, it is important to emphasize two issues: First, the
transformation process in East Germany is not yet fully complete. In many cases, it
is not entirely clear whether that process can be regarded as a success story, or
indeed as a failure. Transformation processes are long-term in nature. And second,
it is by no means clear that the East German experience should provide guidance
for the transformation of other socialist economies. In fact, there are various reasons
to believe that the East German experience in some of its facets presents a special
case (see chapter 2 for more details on this issue). Nonetheless, learning from this
experience is still helpful, and may indeed provide some useful assistance in
managing such restructuring and modernization processes in other countries.
                                                 
2 See Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel /
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1999) and Derlien et al. (1999), p. 5.
3 See Röhl (2001), p. 39.
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2 The Economic Transformation Process in East Germany: A
Unique Case?
The unexpected downfall of the socialist regime in East Germany in 1989, and the
establishment of a democratically elected government soon thereafter, precipitated
an exceptionally rapid process of economic transformation. In the spring of 1990,
the newly elected East German government decided to reorganize the state-owned
production facilities – mostly Kombinate – into joint-stock companies. Soon after-
wards, the Treuhandanstalt (THA) – or Public Trust Company – was created by the
government. The THA was mandated with the management of the privatization
process in East Germany. It was supposed to either sell production facilities
(individually or “en bloc”), or to retransfer property to former owners who were
disenfranchised during the Nazi era or immediately after the end of the Second
World War. The creation of the THA signifies the political will of the ruling elites in
both East and West Germany to mediate and manage the economic transformation
process, rather than to unleash the unfettered forces of the market in the five new
Bundesländer.4
On 1 July 1990, an economic, monetary and social union between the two German
states came into effect. Monetary union came as a shock to the East Germany
economy. With the introduction of the D-Mark (since replaced by the Euro), old
trading relations with Comecon partners immediately broke down – mainly caused
by the 1:1 exchange rate and the introduction of West German pay levels to East
Germany. Labor costs increased dramatically. As a result, many East German
companies slid into a serious liquidity crisis in the fall of 1990. Consequently, there
was immense pressure to modernize and restructure the East German economy in
a very short period of time. A quick and successful privatization process was the first
critical step in that process. Accordingly, the overwhelming number of East German
production facilities were sold before they were modernized. This principle –
privatization before restructuring and modernization – turned into a serious problem
in those cases in which privatization was not accomplished within a reasonable
period of time. Since there was no modernization of production facilities without
privatization, such companies usually lost critical market shares. A fairly significant
number of facilities never went back into production.5
Between 1990 and 1994, the THA privatized, municipalized, or liquidated more than
20.000 companies in East Germany. The preferred option of the THA was to identify
external investors willing to take over formerly state-owned production facilities.
Such Kombinate were reorganized as shareholder companies (AG: “Aktiengesell-
                                                 
4 See Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung/Institut für Weltwirtschaft (1992), p. 24, Czada (1994) and
Dürnhöfer (1998), pp. 61.
5 See Nieters et al. (2000), Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung / Institut für Weltwirtschaft (1992), p. 33,
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel / Institut
für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1999) and Pohl (2002), pp. 30.
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schaft”), the subaltern state-owned companies (VEB: “Volkseigene Betriebe”) as
limited liability companies (GmbH: “Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung”). In most
cases the socialist conglomerates were broken into several smaller parts in order to
accelerate the privatization process. In this fashion, the THA intended to create a
network of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in East Germany. Attempts
to sell Kombinate “en bloc” failed in the overwhelming number of cases.6
The prime challenge in this transformation process was to attract sufficient invest-
ment in a relatively short period of time in order to modernize production facilities. In
1988, production facilities in East Germany were on average 18 years old. In West
Germany, in contrast, the average age was only eight years. Only 20 percent of the
physical infrastructure (buildings, roads, etc.) was considered to be in good
condition by the time West and East Germany reunified in 1990. Yet, there were
also strong regional differences within East Germany. The Northern and Eastern
regions of the GDR – traditionally characterized by a strong agrarian sector – were
used as laboratories for socialist experiments for almost 40 years. Following
common practice in the Soviet Union, the East German government decided to
create new industrial centers in these regions. According to socialist logic, these
industrial “islands” were to facilitate the development of close-knit economic
exchange networks that would generate strong economies of scale and thereby
generate considerable, economic growth. In most cases, however, the benefits from
such economies of scale were tremendously overrated. Nonetheless, at least since
1966, the East Germany government systematically pursued the creation of
Kombinate that tied together state-owned companies on a cross-regional basis. This
model was applied to almost all industrial sectors.7
It was precisely these Kombinate – conglomerates that in many cases dominated
the economic structures of entire cities – that had the most difficulty adjusting to the
economic shock of economic, monetary and social union that came into effect on 1
July 1990. No other economy in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union adopted
an entirely new legal and political framework over night. In that sense, the East
German economy opted for a true shock therapy. Since the Kombinate were of
tremendous significance for the economic survival of entire regions, it was abso-
lutely crucial to develop “shock absorbers” – strategies that would on the one hand
initiate and drive the necessary modernization and restructuring process, but at the
same time ensure the continued existence of a productive economic infrastructure
that would offer jobs for the East German working population. The next chapter will
briefly illustrate four cases of factory towns in East Germany that went through such
a successful transformation process – modernizing and restructuring the regional
economy while offering jobs and economic predictability to East Germans.
                                                 
6 An exception that proves the rule was the chemical plant Schwarzheide, privatized en bloc (BASF; see
Nieters et al. (2000)); see also Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung/Institut für Weltwirtschaft (1992),
p. 24 and Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel /
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1999).
7 See Albach (1998), pp. 12, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für Weltwirtschaft an
der Universität Kiel / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1998), Kujath (1999), pp. 15 and Röhl (2001),
p. 10.
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3 Factory Towns in East Germany: Five Case Studies
3.1 “Eisenhüttenkombinat Ost Eisenhüttenstadt (EKO)”: Privatization
through Investment
Background
The East German steel industry was of strategic significance for the GDR. In 1989,
roughly 200 state-owned companies employed about 210.000 people in the steel
sector. As the following discussion will further emphasize, the productivity in the
steel sector was exceptionally low, in particular compared to Western competitors:
One ton of crude steel produced in the GDR consumed more than 24 working hours,
compared to 4.4 working hours in West Germany. After 1989, steel production in
East Germany decreased dramatically. It is only since 1997 that the sector has
slowly started to recover, after the process of restructuring and modernization was
completed and the worldwide cyclical crisis in the steel market was over. One
indicator for the improved positioning of the East German steel industry can be seen
in the fact that there is relatively strong foreign demand for East German steel
products. Yet, the productivity of the East German steel industry remains well below
West German levels (roughly 60 percent). This is largely the result of firm size and
resulting inefficiencies: East German steel producers are on average about a third
smaller in size than their West German counterparts.8
Eisenhüttenstadt was the first “socialist city” to be created around the “Eisenhütten-
kombinat Ost (EKO),” an industrial conglomerate of steel producing firms under
central control and management.9 The city was the largest steel producer of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR). The city’s economy was entirely dependent on
steel production, a mono-structuration unparalleled even in the socialist world.
Almost 12,000 workers were allocated to EKO. The Kombinat processed pig iron;
later a cold-rolling mill was installed for the production of flat steel. Yet, a full
integration of all production stages was never accomplished. The central missing
element was a hot-rolling mill. This production step was “outsourced” to the Soviet
Union, and later to West German companies. This “steel tourism” is one of the
principal reasons why the East German steel industry never reached the productivity
levels of their West German counterparts.10 EKO remained dependent on imports of
intermediate products throughout its existence. However, this dependency was not
                                                 
8 See Beer (2001), p. 24 and Kohler (1994) pp. 61.
9 On the following see mainly Kohler (1994), pp. 61 and Dr. C. Schwartau, (former responsible for industrial
consulting and support, ministry of economics of the federal state of Brandenburg), personal Interview.
10 Experts called EKO a “central tourism office for semi-finished products”; see Schuenke (1993), p. 120 and
Roesler (1997), pp. 155.
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entirely uncommon in the “coordinated production framework” of the Comecon
system.11
Deconcentration
Obviously, this industrial structure presented a major obstacle for EKO to compete
effectively in world markets. As a result of the specific technical configuration of its
fabrication methods, the internal organization of its management systems, and the
general decentralized nature of production, EKO could never be considered a fully
integrated steel producer. After 1989, there were serious discussions about closing
the production facilities entirely. It is due to the persistence of EKO’s management
and its employees that genuine efforts were made to save at least part of the
Kombinat. Early on in that process, however, it seemed almost impossible to identify
a suitable and sufficiently potent investor.
After the creation of a shareholder company in 1990, the modernization of pro-
duction facilities was started – under the leadership of EKO’s old management. In
order to create a viable steel production facility, investment in a hot-rolling mill was
essential and recognized by all parties involved. Consequently, the government
decided to provide public subsidies and loan guarantees in order to ensure the
construction of a hot-rolling mill; yet, an important precondition for this public
engagement was a matching commitment by a private investor. In 1994, such a
private investor (Cockerill-Sambre-Group, since 2001 part of the Arcenor-Group)
was found.
In 1997, the new hot-rolling mill entered production. Today it is one of the most
modern installations in Europe. Between 1989 and 1997, those few parts of the
EKO-Kombinat that were able to compete in world markets were disinvested. They
initially remained integrated in the steel production process of the original EKO-
Kombinat. However, EKO management scaled down its demand so that these newly
independent companies had to open up new markets and find new customers. At
the same time, EKO’s core business was entirely oriented towards the market.
Sales became the utmost priority.
This disinvestments process resulted in the creation of 35 new companies within five
years. Today, the EKO example serves as a poster child of successful deconcen-
tration and market reform. EKO was able to maintain about two thirds of pre-1989
employment levels, a truly astonishing number given East Germany’s overall rocky
road to market capitalism.
Success Factors
As a result of this phased privatization process, the old EKO management tempo-
rary remained at the helm of the company. Their goal naturally was to avoid the
closing of EKO (the infamous “Abwicklung”). EKO management was supported not
only by all employees, but all other local actors (supplier companies, local and
regional policymakers, business associations, etc.) that were hugely dependent on
                                                 
11 See Beer (2001), p. 24 and Kohler (1994), p. 61.
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EKO as an economic factor in the region. This alliance of management, employees,
and the public at large managed to put sufficient pressure on policymakers and the
THA to make a serious effort to save EKO. As a result of the early modernization
and restructuring efforts that were led by the old EKO management and supported
by the federal government, the private investor did not have to start from scratch. In
1994, the decentralization process was already well underway, and EKO had now
access to a steadily increasing range of suppliers and service providers that had at
least some experience operating in a market context.
3.2 Bitterfeld-Wolfen / Buna / Leuna: A Joint Masterplan for the “Chemical
Triangle“
Background
The chemical industry (similar to the steel industry described in the previous case
study) played a strategic role in the East German economy. In 1988, the chemical
industry generated more than 19 percent of industrial output. During the trans-
formation process, however, this sector quickly turned out to be the most difficult
reform candidate. Even after more than six years of modernization and restructuring,
the industry still suffered from steadily declining revenue levels. It is only since 1997
– after the successful restructuring and modernization of the “Chemical Triangle” –
that the East German chemical industry shows signs of revitalization and healthy
development. Today, it appears safe to argue that the East German chemical
industry is a modern and competitive player on world markets. Between 1989 and
2000, roughly 23 billion D-Mark (approximately 11.5 billion euros) were allocated to
the chemical industry. This makes a stunning 700.000 D-Mark (or 350.00 euros) for
each employee employed in the industry. This is by far the largest sum of money
that any East German sector managed to claim from the public sector. Current
productivity hovers around 86 percent of West German levels. Similar to the steel
case, this divergence in productivity levels can be explained by firm size. East
German chemical companies employ roughly half the number of employees
compared to their West German counterparts.12
It was the declared goal of the THA to save at least the main components of the
East German chemical industry, primarily because of its strategic significance for the
rapidly collapsing labor market. The number of people employed in the chemical
industry in East Germany declined from 180.000 in 1989 to around 32,000 in 1997.
However, these numbers may be misleading since they include lost jobs in areas
not directly linked to the production of chemical goods. As a result, it seems more
appropriate to say that the number of employees in the East German chemical
industry was reduced by 93.000 between 1989 and 1997.13
                                                 
12 See Derlien et al. (1999), p. 4 and Beer (2001), p. 15.
13 See Derlien et al. (1999), pp. 6.
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In the late 1980s, the state-owned companies in the “Chemical Triangle” produced
roughly 50 percent of all chemical goods in East Germany. That constituted almost
10 percent of the entire industrial output of the GDR.14 Almost 50 percent of all
workers living in the “Chemical Triangle” were employed by chemical production
facilities. Bitterfeld was popularly labeled the “pharmacy of the Comecon”.15
The initial starting position for the chemical industry after 1989 seemed so hopeless
that a continuation of production appeared unlikely, if not impossible. The “Chemical
Triangle” was a symbol not just for economic inefficiency. In addition, chemicals
production in East Germany left behind a large number of ecological disaster areas.
The production facilities were old: A third of all facilities were older than 50 years! As
a result, production techniques were antiquated compared to Western standards.
Repair services tied down roughly 30 percent of all employees.16
Deconcentration
As a result of the dreadful condition of production facilities, as well as the great
heterogeneity of production locations, the THA was unable to attract a single
investor for the entire “Chemical Triangle”. It was soon recognized that the key for
successful privatization was the creation of a viable and competitive common
infrastructure. As a result, until 1997, the THA tried to sell off the main components
of the “Chemical Triangle” separately – with little success. As a result, the THA
reintegrated the two main production facilities under a single corporate roof, creating
the holding Bitterfeld-Wolfen GmbH (privatized in 1998).
Over the course of this privatization process, only few core business streams in the
“Chemical Triangle” were preserved (e.g., chlorine production in Bitterfeld). In
Wolfen, for example, managers and the THA were unable to maintain the main
production line (photo films). As a result, management was challenged to attract
new investors. In Leuna, the refinery was quickly identified as a core element for a
new development strategy, and was subsequently sold to a multinational company.
The decision of this multinational to invest in Leuna attracted a broad range of other
chemical and energy companies to the area, effectively creating a new industrial
cluster. In Buna and Schkopau, the formerly state-owned plastic production facilities
were privatized and successfully linked to regional suppliers. In 1994, another
multinational company (Dow Chemical Company) decided to invest in this
production location.
Today, the companies located in the Bitterfeld-Wolfen area are concentrating on
chlorine production. Between 1990 and 1998, 130 companies were privatized. 67 of
these companies were privatized as management buy-outs (MBO) or management
buy-ins (MBI). 233 new companies invested in the area, 13 of which are firms that
specialize in chemicals production. Together, these companies offer more than
10.000 jobs. As a result, the unemployment rate in Bitterfeld is lower than the
regional average. In Leuna, managers and investors were able to maintain the
                                                 
14 On the following see mainly Derlien et al. (1999).
15 Fischer (1993), p. 231.
16 International benchmark figure: maximum 10 percent; see Derlien et al. (1999), p. 5.
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traditional concentration on oil processing: Currently, 150 firms offer more than
10.000 jobs (1989: 27.000). The “Mitteldeutsche Erdöl-Raffinerie GmbH (Mider)”
alone generates roughly 3.4 percent of gross national product in the federal state of
Saxony-Anhaltina. The multinational company invested 5.1 billion D-Mark and offers
more than 3.000 jobs. In Leuna, most companies concentrate on plastics
production, offering roughly 3.000 jobs; suppliers employ another 500 people.17
The decision to facilitate the creation of a cluster of companies concentrating on
chemicals products was not the preferred choice of the THA. It was only after
attempts to privatize the old state-owned conglomerate failed that THA managers
turned to the cluster idea. The cluster concept for the “Chemical Triangle” contained
all the typical steps (privatization of core business activities; privatization along the
value-chain; modernization of particularly critical and/or complex production
facilities; and attraction of new investors). However, it was critical for the eventual
success of the process that the THA recognized the close network structure
between the various production locations in the triangle.18 The Wolfen example
illustrates the danger of domino effects in case parts of such a cluster strategy fail:
In case the privatization and modernization of some components fails, this can have
potentially serious negative external effects for other production locations in the
cluster. Yet, the cluster concept facilitated a business- and market-oriented
privatization without destroying the value of the overall infrastructure (external
economies of scale). The holding company that runs the Chemical Park facilitates
the coordination of the individual businesses situated in the Park. The company also
offers conflict mediation services.19
Success Factors
Despite its rather late start, the “Chemical Triangle” is now widely considered to be
an example of successful deconcentration and privatization. The cluster solution
(i.e., the integrated development of the entire “Chemical Triangle”) was the only
sensible solution to this challenge due to the strong technical and economic inter-
dependencies of the industry. Critical success factors included the development of a
coherent masterplan for the development of the cluster; the maintenance and further
development of a highly skilled labor force in the area; and the wide acceptance of
chemical production facilities by the local population. Of particular relevance was the
recognition that the improvement and development of the industrial infrastructure
was key. What is still missing are sufficient applied research and development
facilities that could ensure a sustainable expansion and improvement of production
facilities in the cluster.
It is interesting to note that this transformation was successful, despite the fact that
the geographical conditions are not altogether favorable (no access to the Baltic or
North Sea). The development of a proper infrastructure (pre-production pipeline
                                                 
17 See Derlien et al. (1999), pp. 17, Semkat (05.01.1996) and Müller (31.10.2000).
18 Small meshed group structures and closed production cycles are typical for this industry, because the
transport or storage of chemical products is always problematic. Numerous by-products are to be processed.
See Nieters et al. (2000) and Derlien et al. (1999), p. 8, p. 25.
19 See Derlien et al. (1999), p. 8, pp. 16 and Nieters et al. (2000).
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Rostock-Böhlen; good traffic infrastructure including highways, railway, and river
waterways) was obviously sufficient to compensate for this structural dis-
advantage.20 It is also interesting to note that West German firms started to copy the
cluster concept in the late 1990s. However, it is also crucial to recognize that this
transformation process could only be successful because of the strong financial
support of the government.
3.3 Niederlausitz (Textiles): “Destitute region” With a Future?
Background
The textiles industry has lost tremendously in significance for the East German
economy. Even though the top East German leadership did not pay much attention
to this part of the country’s industrial infrastructure, there can be no doubt that
textiles production was a very significant part of the socialist economy, in particular
for less developed regions such as the Niederlausitz. Considering the fact that the
textiles sectors has seen significant decline in almost all OECD-countries over the
past three decades, it should not come as a surprise that the East German textiles
industry was almost entirely eliminated after 1989. In 2000, this sector employed
merely 22,500 people in all of East Germany – a drop of a whopping 90 percent
since 1989. Currently, however, this sector exhibits a strong expansion of production
and success in sales all over the world. This demonstrates the success of the
restructuring process, particularly in light of strong competition from low-wage
countries such as for example China or Vietnam. Until 2000, 3 billion D-mark were
invested. Current productivity levels in the East German textiles industry are about
70 percent of those in West Germany. Here, again, the average firm size is the main
explanatory variable. Low profit margins prohibit firms to strengthen their capital
base. As a result, follow-up investment is all but secure.21
The Niederlausitz region, situated close to the Polish border, has a long tradition in
textiles production.22 Yet, until 1989, coal and steel production were developed as
the priority sectors in the region. Also, other textiles production centers in East
Germany were better known and economically more significant than the Nieder-
lausitz (e.g., Saxony, Thuringia). Still, the region featured a clear concentration in
textiles production. After 1989 , the Niederlausitz developed into one of East
Germany’s main crisis regions: The focus on declining industries (coal, steel,
textiles) as well as the peripheral location at the eastern fringes of Germany made it
difficult for the region to modernize, restructure, and attract new investors.
                                                 
20 Dow Chemical’s first reaction: „ We don’t like things that aren’t on deep water...“; see Derlien et al. (1999),
pp. 36.
21 See Beer (2001), p. 45.
22 On the following see mainly Thomas (2002).
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Deconcentration
Already in the 1950s (!), textile production facilities in the Niederlausitz were
considered outdated. Between then and the reunification, there was almost no
significant investment in capital goods. Production techniques and machines were
hopelessly archaic, resulting in a high cost structure and low quality output. After
1989, the THA considered investment in textiles production in East Germany as
economically senseless; there was wide agreement that there could be no cost
competitive textiles production in Germany. As a result, attempts to privatize the
industry were only a very low priority. There were only very few privatization
schemes that brought in investors from West Germany or abroad, most of which
failed after only a few years. Potential strategic partners from West Germany did not
show much interest to build productive capacity in East Germany. It certainly did not
help that the industry did not have a strong lobby in the THA and the government.
The number of employees in the textiles sector contracted between 1989 and 1993
from 11,300 to 1,400; the number of companies dropped from 51 to 20. Prospects
for the remaining firms appeared bleak, to say the least.
This disintegration of the textiles industry was not met with much opposition from
employees and the broader public. It is only since 1993 that the strategic signify-
cance of the textiles industry for the Niederlausitz has started to reappear as an
important economic policy issue in the regional press and public policy discussions.
The textiles industry has been rediscovered as a crucial component of the region’s
traditional identity. This became obvious, for example, during the recent “Bundes-
gartenschau” (a publicly sponsored garden and architecture show) in Cottbus that
featured a textiles symposium and a fair for regional fashion.
But the Niederlausitz has moved far beyond such symbolic acts. Various entre-
preneurs started to re-launch textiles production in the region, initially without any
support of the skeptical THA. The citizens of the Niederlausitz and the innovation
initiatives joined forces to create a common alliance against the THA that refused to
provide support. A few regional policy entrepreneurs also started recognize the
potential of this self-driven entrepreneurial process and decided to support new
textiles companies in the region. Today, the textiles industry employs roughly 1,500
people in the region. So far, there is nothing to suggest that these companies will
not be able to compete successfully in the well into the future.
Success Factors
This comparatively small example demonstrates, if anything, one important fact:
Frustration can, under certain circumstances, generate not just negative, but also
significant positive energy. The local population in the Niederlausitz largely
considered itself as the “losers” of German reunification. The frustration reached a
point where people in the region felt the only way forward was to take matters into
their own hands. A critical stage was reached when an external investor failed to live
up to his earlier promises, due to a combination of unprofessional behavior and bad
economic planning. The long tradition of the region in producing textiles products for
domestic and export markets was another critical factor for success. Nobody in the
region expected any significant help from the outside; investors avoided the
Niederlausitz, and the government as well as the THA did not have any viable
concepts for the region’s economic development. As a result, people decided to go
back to the old traditions of the region – against expert advice but still successful.
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3.4 “Schwermaschinenbau-Kombinat Magdeburg (SKET)”: Stony Path
Towards Capitalism
Background
Machine construction was the most significant industrial sector in the East German
economy, with more than 540.000 workers employed in more than 600 state-owned
companies. After reunification, the machine industry all but collapsed: The necessity
to restructure and modernize in order to generate improved competitive, coupled
with a deep cyclical crisis that shook the global machine tool industry from 1992 to
1994, put the East German producers under enormous pressure. As a result, the
THA was unable to identify potent investors. Since 1995, the market has seen some
improvement. Until 2000 almost 12.5 billion D-Mark were invested. Still, capital
investment per workplace remains roughly 20 percent below West German levels. In
contrast to most other industrial sectors, the machine tool industry has never
regained pre-1991 production levels. Productivity also remains at 70 to 75 percent of
West German levels. As in all other cases, the reason for this productivity gap can
be explained with the comparatively small firm size in East Germany (the average
firm in East Germany is only half as big as the average firm in West German), as
well as the difficult market situation that has a negative impact on firm
capitalization.23
Magdeburg, today the capital of the federal state of Saxony-Anhaltina, was regarded
as the GDR’s heavy machine tool hub. The SKET Kombinat manufactured complete
production facilities and exported those into the entire world. It functioned as a
general contractor for hot-rolling mills and metal production facilities. In 1989, the 18
individual components of the Kombinat employed more than 30.000 people.
80 percent of the entire production were destined for export markets.24
Deconcentration
An early plan for the restructuring and modernization of SKET foresaw the
preservation of the core competencies of the old Kombinat as part of a single
corporate structure in order to uphold existing customer relations. That plan was
also designed to ensure the continued ability to export the entire assortment of
products. The THA, the owner of SKET, fully supported these plans. Existing
contracts seemed to justify this initial optimism right after reunification. As a result,
SKET opened foreign offices and promoted cooperation agreements with a wide
range of international companies. Yet, the initial positive start soon deteriorated into
a debacle as markets in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union collapsed. The
attempt to use barter contracts to maintain export markets utterly failed. The widely
anticipated investment boom in the domestic machine tool market never material-
lized. An attempt to privatize SKET “en bloc” with the help of a strategic investor,
launched in early 1996, failed as well. During this phase, the THA expected less
                                                 
23 See Beer (2001), p. 13.
24 See Semkat (05.01.1996) and Ladwig (1993), pp. 271.
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than 1,000 employees to remain in the SKET Kombinat; at a later point, these
projections were further lowered to 540.25
At the end of 1996, against the declared intentions of the German government (and
particularly against the wishes of then-chancellor Helmut Kohl), the deconcentration
process of SKET commenced. Prior to that, there was simply no consensus on how
to proceed. Consequently, the privatization process ensued in a very conflictual
fashion. As the deconcentration process unfolded, however, all companies of the
former SKET Kombinat were able to expand their markets and product ranges. For
example, one of these companies now produces wind energy equipment and
exports its products nationwide. Other follower companies produce oil seed techno-
logy or stranding machines. The last part of SKET that was privatized now offers hot
and cold-rolling technology and engineering services. The privatization of SKET was
supported with 1,3 billion D-mark in public subsidies.26
While SKET employed in the core business area more than 10,000 people in 1990,
the follower companies provide work opportunities for only 2,000 men and women in
Saxony-Anhaltina. Yet, despite this tremendous loss of jobs, the privatization
process still has to be viewed as a qualified success. Most observers expected a
collapse of the entire industry.27
Success factors
Initial attempts to maintain and expand traditional export markets in the former
Comecon countries in order to facilitate and smooth the restructuring and moderni-
zation process failed. The other attempt to transform the Kombinat – “en bloc”
privatization – did not produce results either. It took the central actors (SKET’s
management, the THA, the German government as well as potential investors) a
considerable period of time to recognize that market oriented deconcentration was
the only viable option. The SKET follower companies appear to be comparatively
stable and well positioned in the market.
                                                 
25 See Ladwig (1993), pp. 273 and Semkat (12.01.1996)
26 See Die Welt (16.10.1996) and Semkat (25.09.1998).
27 See Semkat (05.01.1996), Ladwig (1993), p. 272 and Semkat (12.01.1996)
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3.5 “Rohrkombinat Riesa” (Steel- and Rolling Mill): Successful Dissolution
of a Kombinat
Background28
Riesa – a major steel production location in the GDR – is strategically located at the
periphery of the triangle Leipzig – Dresden – Chemnitz.29 Until 1989, more than
20.000 employees worked in the 10 industrial production facilities in the city.
Riesa has a long tradition in steel production, going all the way back to the 1840s.
After the Second World War, steel production facilities were reconstructed and
reorganized as the “VEB Stahl- und Walzwerk”, a state-owned conglomerate. In
1969, that conglomerate became the core component of a Kombinat specializing on
tube production, with main branch plants in Riesa, Freital and Görlitz. In terms of
total employment, the facility in Riesa employed roughly 12,000 workers. As was
common in the GDR, the Kombinat also provided a wide range of social services
(sports facilities, the arts and theater, as well as daycare for children).
Deconcentration
The disastrous competitive situation of East German steel producers after 1989 led
to a strong reduction in output within a matter of months after the economic, mone-
tary and social union in July 1990. A worldwide crisis in steel markets and the loss of
export markets in Eastern Europe further contributed to the problem. An analysis of
Riesa’s productive capacity in 1990 identified outdated and oversized production
facilities, as well as over-employment and extreme maintenance costs (30 percent
of all employees were working in machine maintenance and repair) as the main
reasons for the competitive disadvantage of Riesa steel. Incompatible production
machines as well as an inefficient organization of transport between the various
production locations contributed their fair share to the situation. As a result, most
observers agreed that a modernization of production facilities did not make much
sense from an economic perspective. The fact that the VEB was also responsible for
a wide range of other products and services in the region – the construction of
apartments for workers and energy supply – made the modernization and
restructuring task even more difficult.
As a result of a major steel crisis in the early 1980s, the West German steel pro-
ducers had just modernized their production facilities from the ground up. Therefore,
from an international perspective, their productivity levels were relatively high. For
that reason, West German companies showed very little interest in investing in
existing steel plants in the new Bundesländer. In 1990, the Kombinat was reorga-
nized as Stahlwerke Riesa AG (SWR AG). As a result of a lack of potential
investors, the new management of SWR AG started to develop its own business
and development plan. The goal was to privatize all parts of the SWR AG. As part of
                                                 
28 For a description and analysis of the sector’s development and current status see section 3.1.
29 On the following see mainly Rehse (1996).
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this new strategy, all competitive segments of the SWR AG had to be privatized until
1993. The remainder was to be closed down. The plan also foresaw that all un-
necessary real estate be sold until 1995 (e.g., vacation resorts traditionally
maintained by state-owned companies in the GDR). The new management also
sought to attract other companies to the region, and to tear down all unnecessary
production facilities. This modernization and restructuring effort necessarily resulted
into a huge loss of jobs. The new business plan included certain social provisions to
moderate the strong negative effects, and also included new measures to further
educate the remaining workforce.
In 1995, there existed almost 70 companies operating at the old VEB production
sites. These companies employed more than 4.000 people. 56 percent of new
companies that were created between 1989 and 1995 were founded by local
entrepreneurs. 265 of the new companies came from West Germany, 11 percent
from abroad. Most companies (88 percent) have less than 50 employees. Only 9
percent employ more than 100 workers.
This modernization and restructuring process and the resulting creation of a modern
industrial park turned out to be an expensive undertaking: More than 91,700 euros
were invested per newly created workplace. 44 percent of these costs were covered
by the THA, the federal employment agency (“Bundesanstalt für Arbeit”), and the
SWR AG. The SWR AG was liquidated in due course. Today, Riesa’s economy is
still characterized by the steel industry. 63 percent of the employed workforce
receives paychecks from steel companies.
Success Factors
In Riesa, all stakeholders decided to work together: Employees, trade unions, local
and regional governments, ministries and the THA – despite a massive loss of jobs
and the corresponding social frictions that ensued. The employees did not only trust
their new management, they also demonstrated significant willingness to help close
the productivity gap to their West German neighbors. Active labor market policy
contributed to a slight amelioration of the significant negative consequences of job
losses. A comprehensive and objective market analysis was critical for the design of
the successful restructuring plan.
Transforming “Factory Towns”       page 17
4 Successful Transformation of Socialist Factory Towns: Some
Propositions
As was noted at the outset of this study, the lessons learned from the East German
experience may only be of limited value for economic policymakers and investors in
the other transformation economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Nonetheless, various “best practices” are without doubt relevant for other countries.
The following sections formulate a number of such best practices in the form of
propositions.
4.1 The Restructuring of Centralized Production: Nine Propositions
As noted above, the economic framework conditions in East Germany changed
radically over night. The introduction of the D-Mark and the adoption of the West
German legal market framework exerted enormous pressure on East German
companies to become more competitive in a short period of time. Quick and
successful modernization and restructuring became critical preconditions for
survival. As was noted at the outset, the modernization and restructuring of a
formerly state-owned company is a complex process that is very much dependent
on specific framework conditions – political as well as economic. Yet, based on the
case studies analyzed in the previous section, we can formulate a number of
propositions regarding factors that positively contribute to transformation.
Proposition 1 Clearly define core business areas.
The precise and proper definition of core business areas of a transforming company
is crucial for the further successful development and implementation of the moderni-
zation and restructuring process. In addition to identifying main business areas and
core separable performance units, it is also worthwhile to consider the relevance of
cross-sectional performance units. Such units either have to be newly created or
have to be brought in (purchased) from the outside. It is of crucial importance to
define a clear market niche within which the company can be successful. External
feasibility studies can play a helpful role in this context. It is also essential to
recognize the necessity of building new corporate structures to advance the
modernization process. As a result of the deconcentration process of a Kombinat,
new tasks such as procurement, distribution, or marketing have to be developed and
integrated into corporate management.30
                                                 
30 See Albach (1993), pp. 10.
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Proposition 2 A critical precondition for successful transformation is cost
transparency.
A critical precondition for a successful deconcentration process is comprehensive
and precise knowledge about the resulting costs in each unit. The establishment of
a cost ratio system facilitates access to detailed information about cost categories,
cost intensity per employee, cost intensity per product, etc. This is particularly
relevant for an external comparison of cost structures and efficiency. With the
assistance of such a costing system, the deconcentration process can be initiated
through appropriate budgeting. This also includes a realistic, market-based valuation
of company assets and capacities.31
Proposition 3 It is difficult if not impossible to determine the net value of a
company during a transformation process.
In most cases, the net value of fixed assets of a company deteriorates dramatically
during a transformation process since the “hardware” does no longer suit the overall
framework conditions.32 When assessing the net value of fixed assets of a company,
it is important to recognize that the predominant methods for the evaluation of the
capital value (net present value analysis)33 and the substantive value (net asset
valuation method, property valuation method)34 are only applicable to a limited
extent: It is impossible to quantify various critical elements under the specific circum-
stances of a reconstruction process. The concept of valuating networks, in contrast,
integrates factors such as stability, diversity, volume etc. and therefore offers a
useful complementary approach to assessing net value levels.35 Still, even this
approach can only offer a partial assessment of the economic position of a company
during a fundamental transformation process. Numbers will necessarily remain
incomplete.
Proposition 4 It is crucial to determine the actual level of risk.
The valuation tool described above provides a first informed impression regarding
the current level of economic risk and exposure a company faces. For example, a
cost ratio system allows management to determine whether a company is over-
indebted. If that is the case, it is essential to determine whether the short-term
viability of the company can be ensured by further deconcentration, creditor
negotiations, etc. The cost ratio will also show whether or not a company faces an
imminent liquidity crisis. If that is the case, it is essential to determine whether there
                                                 
31 Substantial distortions in the reporting are typical for socialist economies, caused by immanent incentives for
incomplete, inaccurate or wrong figures. See Schweickart (1997), p. 8.
32 See Albach (1998), p. 32 and Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für Weltwirtschaft an
der Universität Kiel / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1998).
33 Totaling of the bar values / deposit values on the current time; see Albach (1993), p. 68.
34 This method defines the replacement value of assets and liablities as the minimum net present value. See
Albach (1993), p. 68.
35 See Albach (1993), p. 76.
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are ways to bridge the liquidity crisis through short-term cash credits from banks or
guarantees from the government. In this context, it is important to identify the “crisis
units” within the company, i.e. those parts of the corporate structure primarily
responsible for the predicament.36
Proposition 5 A restructuring concept creates an atmosphere of dependability
and allows regular progress reviews.
The steps listed in the first two propositions are part of a systematic analysis of the
company status quo. Based on that analysis, a proper restructuring concept needs
to be developed before further (potentially irreversible) actions are taken. The
restructuring concept may be revised and updated as the process goes along.
However, the main elements and goals of the transformation process need to be
clearly spelled out right from the start. The first crucial feature of a restructuring
concept is the systematic analysis and discussion of all possible action scenarios.
Furthermore, a restructuring concept needs to clearly describe next steps and
milestones along the way – to create trust among all those involved, including the
employees. Transparency is crucial in this context. All the case studies discussed in
the previous section have demonstrated the importance of the commitment of
employees to the success of company transformation process. In some cases, it
was due to the persistence of employees (and their effective and close cooperation
with company management) that a successful restructuring process was initiated
and implemented, despite the lack of support from the government and/or private
investors.37 The development of a restructuring concept is also an indispensable
tool for the constructive engagement of third parties (government, private banks,
creditors, potential investors, etc.) into the overall modernization and restructuring
process.
Proposition 6 It is important to identify and secure know-how present within the
company.
A significant part of industrial-technical know-how is independent of economic
framework conditions and remains crucially important for the company itself. Yet, the
necessary knowledge with regard to legal and organizational issues will probably
change radically during the transformation. In these cases, companies should be
prepared to qualify their employees.38
During economic crises, companies have two options with regard to personnel
management: They can either try to motivate their employees, or they can attempt
to cut short-term personnel-related costs. Most companies usually use a combi-
nation of both strategies, which can be problematic. The case studies presented
above have demonstrated the importance of employee motivation as a crucial
                                                 
36 See Dürnhöfer (1998), pp. 104.
37 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 201.
38 See Albach (1993), p. 9 and p. 15 and Albach (1994), p. 35.
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success factor during the transformation process. Yet, betrayed expectations can
also generate the opposite result. In case the company is already in the full grip of a
crisis, layoffs are usually unavoidable, since personnel costs are the most significant
cost factor (as was noted above, fixed assets rapidly lose their value during the
process). Depending on the legal framework conditions, layoffs can become
effective fairly quickly. However, while layoffs may improve the economic situation of
a company in the short-term, it also results in a loss of potentially important human
capital. As a result, companies usually prefer to progress along the following steps:
First, companies will cut down on overtime, and will also stop hiring new employees.
In a second step, the company will use cost efficient methods to cut down the
number of employees (e.g., early retirement schemes). Finally, company
management will layoff non-essential personnel, primarily those working in the
administrative units of the company. Management usually tries to keep essential
staff members that are crucial for the successful operation of the company.
However, it is precisely those employees who are the most mobile and therefore the
most willing to leave.39
Proposition 7 Promote market-relevant know-how.
Entrepreneurial knowledge is crucial for a company operating in a competitive
market economy. The experiences in East Germany demonstrate that crucial
business management knowledge was missing on all levels in more than 90 percent
of all cases.40. Here it is crucial to differentiate between explicit knowledge (can be
procured through licenses or management consultants) and implicit knowledge
about company specific business methods, trust relationships with suppliers, etc.
Implicit knowledge is difficult to create, and requires long-term experiences and
investments. Standard know-how is usually insufficient to be successful in the
marketplace. When companies face entirely new framework conditions, implicit
knowledge needs to be nurtured and facilitated as part of a long-term development
process. Of course, a complete package of both explicit and implicit knowledge can
be “procured” through the sale of the company to a market-savy and experienced
firm. Yet, in case such an external investor is not found, the company will face a
wide range of problems in acquiring this crucial “knowledge package” in an
adequate period of time (this is especially true in the case of management buy-
outs). This applies particularly to company management, that may have only very
little time during the restructuring process to acquire the necessary knowledge and
expertise.41
                                                 
39 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 178.
40 See Albach (1993), p. 9. and p. 15 and Albach (1994), p. 35.
41 See Albach (1998), p. 19 and Burchert (1996), p. 31.
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Proposition 8 Distribution systems should be maintained; the quality of suppliers
should be evaluated.
A lack of adequate liquidity is a trademark of almost all companies that go through a
transformation process. For this reason, it is crucial to maintain and cultivate
established distribution systems. In many cases this means that product sales have
to move to the center of company activities in order to avoid the serious con-
sequences of a liquidity crisis. In centrally planned economies, such a focus on
sales was rather unusual (if not unheard of).42 It is important to recognize in this
context, however, that customers may no longer accept the same level of quality.
This applies in particular in those cases in which external competitors are able to
quickly enter the market. The quality of intermediate products should be critically
evaluated in this context. As a result, it may become necessary to develop a new
network of suppliers.43
Proposition 9 The deconcentration process needs to progress quickly. Yet,
speed should not come at the expense of good planning.
The East German experience demonstrates that privatization “en bloc” is almost
impossible to implement in practice – despite the fact that West Germany leveraged
substantial financial and other resources to bankroll such an exercise. A sustainable
and effective restructuring process can only be implemented on the basis of a
coherent deconcentration concept. There can be no doubt that the specific form of
the deconcentration process has a significant influence on the future success of
individual companies that emerge from that process. The common path of
deconcentration proceeds along the value chain. Each individual company needs to
be able to produce competitive goods and/or services for the marketplace in an
autonomous fashion. This horizontal form of deconcentration maintains supplier
relationships and, as a result, allows companies to secure established production
chains at least for some period of time. The smaller the specificity of individual
products, the higher the probability that the newly created companies will develop
new supplier and distribution systems over time. The probability of company survival
increases with the number of potential buyers and suppliers. These facilitate a lower
dependency on the original network of suppliers and buyers developed as part of
the Kombinat. At the same time, all individual units of the former conglomerate
remain in existence, and the necessary human capital is not lost. In this context, it is
also important to consider the fact that firms need to maintain a certain size in order
to be sustainable in the future.44 It may also be possible to outsource cross sectional
units to external service providers. Non-essential services (e.g., management of firm
canteens, vacation homes, etc.) should be not be part of a company’s overall
portfolio.45
                                                 
42 See Schweickart (1997), p. 8.
43 See Albach (1998), p. 16.
44 See Kohler (1994), p. 88 and Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 167.
45 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 161.
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4.2 Macroeconomic Management and Privatization Policy During the
Transformation Process: Seven Propositions
Proposition 1 The privatization process should be implemented quickly.
As soon as the decision has been taken to initiate a deconcentration process to
centralized socialist economic structures, it is crucial to also quickly launch the
privatization process. The companies that emerge from such a deconcentration
process can only be successful in the marketplace when they are under private
ownership and management. This applies in particular to the necessary
rehabilitation process. Restructuring under public sector management often remains
incomplete and inconsistent, due to political-economic reasons. The rehabilitation
costs that are incurred after privatization should therefore be smaller compared to
the costs that would apply in case restructuring was planned and implemented by
the government. All of this, of course, presupposes that the government decides to
privatize unrehabilitated production facilities. Under these circumstances, a quick
privatization is of the essence. Otherwise, further losses in the net value of fixed
assets have to be expected.46
A consistent reform policy should also allow bankruptcies and failures. Of course,
this is particularly difficult (if not politically impossible) in the case of factory towns.
Yet, inefficient production facilities cannot and should not be maintained (and there-
fore subsidized) for a long time without the prospect that they will eventually be
successful in the marketplace. Yet, even in those cases in which the core business
of a Kombinat needs to be closed, there may be certain parts of the old con-
glomerate that could perform well in a competitive market.47
Proposition 2 Policymakers and public administration can play constructive role
in facilitating a quick and successful privatization process.
Policymakers, public administrators, and the privatization agency should act quickly
and consistently during privatization processes. The East German experience has
demonstrated time and again that swiftness and flexibility significantly improve the
probability of economic survival for the affected companies. For that very reason,
the principle of “Priority of Investment” was applied to all official approval procedures
in East Germany, thereby significantly expediting bureaucratic processes. Good
relations between companies and the local and regional public administration is a
critical success factor in this context. This also presupposes the existences of
capable and decisive public managers.48 In order to facilitate the speedy re-
structuring of factory towns, the necessary bureaucratic processes have to be
initiated at a very early point in time. As demonstrated in some of the examples
discussed in the previous section, a masterplan for the entire region may in fact be a
                                                 
46 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 225.
47 See Schweickart (1997), p. 9 and Brocker (1999).
48 See Albach (1998), p. 31 and Derlien et al. (1999), p. 37.
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helpful planning device. On the national level, the necessary legal and institutional
preconditions for privatization need to be put in place. This includes an allocation of
clear roles and responsibilities in the privatization exercise, with transparent and
explicable sales procedures.49
Proposition 3 Open markets increase the efficiency of the restructuring process.
External competitors and investors are attracted by open markets. Both are useful
for the restructuring process.
As a result of the centralized production structures that emerged as a result of
socialist planning, a successful deconcentration process may not necessarily result
in competitive market structures. Such structures have to be seen as a requirement
for outsourced companies to develop new delivery and supply chains. Competitors
accelerate this development.50
External investors can significantly increase the speed of the transformation process
since they facilitate the transfer of crucial intellectual infrastructure into the newly
created company. The speed of rehabilitation is also dependent on the possibility to
implement reform measures in a forceful and effective way. This applies particularly
to companies under majority ownership (>50%). Albach elaborates the outstanding
importance of access to the implicit know-how of market economy networks for the
transformation process. Therefore, privatization by strategic (foreign) investors
theoretically promises higher transaction cost efficiency. The experience in East
Germany also shows that external investors, on average, (are able to) invest more
than locals.51
Proposition 4 The specific form of privatization is dependent on important
political premises.
Privatization procedures can be differentiated according to two basic criteria: A
state-owned company can be transferred to a new owner gratis or with a price tag;
and the contract of sale can be either standardized or customized. Based on these
two criteria, we can develop the following ideal-types:
                                                 
49 See Brocker (1999).
50 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 225.
51 See Albach (1998), p. 22, Albach (1993), p.90 and Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut
für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1998).
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Complexity of Transfer Agreements
Standardized Contract Customized Contract
Gratis Transfer Voucher-Privatization=
„People’s Shares“
Re-privatization
P
ri
ce
Sale Auction or Stock
Exchange Privatization
Informal Sales
Negotiations
Source: Dürnhöfer (1998), p.232.
Empirical analyses show that the specific form of privatization does not have any
immediate consequences for the overall speed of the process. Each option has its
advantages and disadvantages: For example, in case privatization is mediated
through a stock exchange, that process does not ensure that the buyers will have
sufficient financial capital to finance the necessary modernization investments.
Finally, stock exchange privatization provides the government, management, and
employees only with very little opportunity to influence the determinants of the
eventual transformation process. Privatization through stock exchanges also pre-
supposes the existence of efficient capital markets. This also applies to voucher
privatization. In the case of re-privatization, those eligible to gain control over the
company (in many cases the generation of grandchildren) may not have the
economic competency to manage a successful transformation process. Individual
negotiations, at the same time, do not feature an open competition of bidders. This
opens the door to intransparent decision-making and corruption. Obviously. the
choice of privatization method is a political one and is often the result of a difficult
and controversial negotiation process. The advantages and disadvantages of the
various privatization methods are summarized in a table in the appendix (p. 36).52
Proposition 5 The government may offer financial incentives to support the
transformation process. Yet, long-term subsidies should be
avoided.
In order to speed up the privatization process, the government may offer financial
incentives. Targeted, nonrecurring subsidies should be the norm. Such subsidies
may also allow the government to attach conditions to a privatization process that
may follow from political objectives (e.g., saving jobs or a minimum level of invest-
ment). The subsidy should be designed to compensate the investor for potential
disadvantages related to the specific production site. Permanent subsidies should
be avoided. They are not only a liability for the state budget. In the long-term, they
may also inhibit the development of sustainable and market-oriented corporate
                                                 
52 See Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 232.
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strategies.53
Proposition 6 In some cases, the modernization of core business facilities may
have to be completed before privatization.
Certain industrial sectors are highly dependent on the existence of a strong
technical and logistical infrastructure to support their highly integrated and resource
intensive production cycles (e.g., the chemical sector). This is not to say that such
“utilities” cannot be privatized. Yet, experience shows that such companies only
become interesting for potential investors in case other companies have already
invested at the same site.
The case study “Chemical Triangle” demonstrates that it may make sense under
such circumstances to modernize certain segments of the former socialist con-
glomerate in order to support the overall restructuring process. That way, companies
can concentrate on their core productive activities. Other necessary support
services (e.g., pipelines, vocational education, firm canteens, etc.) can be procured
from competing local service companies. This results into lower overall investment
costs, since various companies can share the support service network. Since
companies can concentrate on their core competencies and have to invest less into
non-essential services, their competitive position in the market is strengthened.54
This model is particularly relevant for factory towns. In most cases, it is fair to
assume that newly created companies located in the formerly socialist factory towns
will remain active in the same core business sectors. In case that sector promises
future growth potential, it may make sense for the government to subsidize the
improvement of local infrastructure to facilitate and support the modernization of
economic structures. The same applies to those cases in which there is a strong
degradation of the environment as a result of previous production practices. A
rehabilitation of the environment often is a precondition for privatization, since
private investors do not want to incur the costs of cleaning up.55
Proposition 7 Attracting new companies is necessary for the successful
completion of a restructuring process.
Even if the modernization and restructuring process of a Kombinat is wildly
successful, it is highly unlikely that the newly competitive companies will offer the
same number of jobs to the local workforce. Unemployment is a notorious feature of
the transformation process. The creation of new companies and external settlers are
therefore crucial just from the perspective of creating new and necessary jobs for
the local economy. Yet, the diversification of local economies is also a critical
                                                 
53 See Schweickart (1997), p. 13 and Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Berlin / Institut für
Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (1998).
54 See Derlien et al. (1999), p. 21.
55 See Derlien et al. (1999), p. 8.
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precondition for the sustainable growth of an entire region. In addition, increased
competition among the deconcentrated companies amplifies the necessity to
become more competitive. The entire production chain profits from improved
competitiveness, due to lower prices for intermediate products.56 A factory town is
able to reduce its dependency on a single economic sector through diversification,
and as a result protects the entire region against asymmetrical cyclical crises.
4.3 Labor Market and Social Polices and the Transformation Process: Five
Propositions
The privatization of former Kombinate and VEB usually results into a massive loss of
jobs for the local economy. In order to reduce costs and to increase productivity,
investors need to be able to cut jobs. Considering the typical cost functions of the
former state-owned enterprises, the creation of profitable jobs is a central challenge
of the transformation process. As a result, transformation processes are almost
always tied to steadily increasing unemployment rates. Public policymakers have to
adopt a number of corresponding measures in order to balance the social and
political consequences of that process. Only a collaborative approach that brings
together all actors of the privatization process can succeed in managing the
transformation process in a socially acceptable way.57
Proposition 1 The maintenance of jobs has to be a significant guiding factor for
the government in privatization negotiations with potential
investors.
The restructuring and modernization of Kombinate usually results into massive job
losses. All transformation countries have to devise a political response to this
inevitable development. The government can directly influence the employment
strategy of investors during the privatization negotiations. A sensible middle way
needs to be devised that balances the requirements of the investor to rationalize
production and to turn the company into a competitive market player, with the goal
and mandate of the government to secure as many jobs as possible.
The leverage of the government in this context is the sales price. The government
may lower the price and also offer investment subsidies in case the investor issues
certain guarantees with regard to employment levels. In addition, the investor can
also be integrated into indirect job generation mechanisms, such as “employment
companies” (see below). The German government has signed many such agree-
ments during the transformation process. In case companies have violated the
agreement, they had to pay fines, or the sales price was adjusted retroactively. It is
important to point out, however, that the restructuring and modernization process
                                                 
56 See Albach (1998), p. 32 and Derlien et al. (1999), p. 21.
57 See Pohl (2000), p. 227 and Brocker (1999).
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should not fail as a result of demands for unrealistic employment guarantees. The
experience in East Germany shows that companies usually abide by such
agreements.58
Proposition 2 Management Buy-outs preserve jobs.
A particularly close relationship between buyer and employees exists in the case of
management buy-outs (MBO). In case such an MBO is a realistic alternative, we
can expect a strong interest on the part of company management to preserve jobs,
at least when compared to a potential external investor. A certain sense of responsi-
bility on the part of the old (and new) management, as well as strong loyalty on the
part of the employees, are factors that are very difficult to set down in a written
contract. Yet, they are important factors for a successful restructuring and moderni-
zation process. MBOs may be a preferable option for privatization since the new
owners have a high degree of implicit knowledge about the specific company at
hand. They know the implicit and explicit corporate structures inside-out, and they
are also well aware of all the supplier and buyer relationships the company main-
tains. One disadvantage of MBOs in formerly socialist economies is the lack of
qualification of management. Yet, this qualification only applies in cases where
privatization is implemented over night, as was the case in East Germany. In other
formerly socialist economies, a step-wise transformation allowed individuals to
“learn on the job” about the rules of the capitalist economy.
Due to the second disadvantage, limited financial means of most managers of
formerly state-owned enterprises, MBOs most apply only to small enterprises. For
such small companies, there is usually also a lack of interest from external
investors. MBOs are a critical factor in building a local structure of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SME) – a critical contribution to building a larger and
more diversified economic base for the factory towns.59
Proposition 3 The restructuring process requires a flexible approach with regard
to legal social protection clauses.
The restructuring and modernization of formerly state-owned enterprises frequently
collides with social protection clauses. This applies in particular with regard to “hiring
and firing” rules. In case Western-style rules had been applied to East Germany
during the transformation process, it would have been almost impossible for
investors to fundamentally rebuild the personnel structure. This would have under-
mined all restructuring efforts. A more flexible approach towards social protection is
crucial to facilitate a quick and successful transformation process. The same applies
to compensation rules, that have the potential to ruin a newly created company.
During the restructuring process, massive layoffs can also be avoided by con-
cessions with regard to pay levels. Due to exceptional circumstances, employers
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and employees can agree to freeze the pay levels for a certain period of time. They
may also agree to cut vacation time, at least temporarily. The government has to
create the adequate legal framework conditions to facilitate a more flexible
environment for the transformation process. Agreements between employers and
employees on the level of the company can facilitate a flexible adoption of such
exceptions; that way, employers also feel a certain sense of obligation to the
process.60
Proposition 4 Employment companies contribute to active labor market policy.
Publicly supported Employment and Training Companies (ETC) can play an
important role in providing unemployed workers with new opportunities. In East
Germany, ETCs were created as a joint exercise of employers, trade unions, and
regional representatives. The participation of employers in the ETCs was usually
negotiated as part of the privatization agreements drawn up between external
investors, the THA and the government. The financing for the ETCs was provided
through various revenue streams: The unemployment benefits of displaced workers,
third party contracts (including from the public sector, as well as companies that jad
laid off workers), additional contributions from the federal employment agency, as
well as contributions from the local and national governments). Displaced workers
are not forced to work for an ETC. In contrast, they voluntarily decide to sign a work
contract. (Alternatively, they can receive unemployment benefits.) ETCs are not
profit-oriented companies. Their goal is to provide work and market-oriented
qualification opportunities for workers displaced as a result of company
transformation processes.61
Proposition 5 Give employees and trade unions a stake in the transformation
process.
The East German experience demonstrates that providing those affected by reforms
with a significant stake in the transformation process is a crucial precondition for the
success and sustainability of the reforms. During a process of economic trans-
formation, this may apply to the employees directly, or to those that represent their
interests (i.e. trade unions). Yet, providing those affected with a stake in the process
should not result raising unrealistic expectations. It is important to clearly assess the
economic situation, and to indicate the steps that have to be taken, no matter how
painful they may be. The East German experience shows that employees and
management are usually convinced that “their company” is quite productive and
competitive – despite the fact that the new framework conditions require a complete
reassessment of the net value of a company’s assets. It is crucial to raise aware-
ness among employees and trade unions for this fundamental problem in order to
receive their support for the transformation process. If that does not succeed, a
demotivated work force will be the result. Under such circumstances, the top
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61 See Jürgens et al. (1993), p. 232, Brocker (1999) and Mayer (2000).
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performers in the company will use every opportunity they get to exit. The break-
down of the transformation process may be the result.62
4.4 The Important Role of Regional Planning: Three Propositions
Proposition 1 The region should be the engine of the transformation process.
Local and regional policymakers and public administrators are most familiar with the
economic troubles of their region. These public elites – out of their own self-interest
– have to be the main supporters and advocates of the economic restructuring and
modernization process. In difficult phases of the transformation process, it should be
regional policy elites and administrators that have to bring all actors to the
negotiating table.
The case study “Niederlausitz” demonstrates how effective regional policies and a
strong regional identity can defy conventional economic wisdom. There may also be
a strong identification of the population with a local company that has provided jobs
as well as goods and services for the region for decades. Such a strong regional
identity and close association of the local population with specific companies can
have a strong positive impact on the motivation of employees. Regional employment
“pacts” can make another significant contribution to that process.63 As noted above,
in some cases the development of a regional masterplan may be a useful tool to
sketch out the economic potential of the entire region. Such a masterplan can also
be a helpful device to manage expectations.
Proposition 2 Local and regional bodies have to provide crucial social services.
In socialist planned economies, state-owned companies were frequently mandated
to provide critical social services to their employees and to the public at large. It has
to be part of the restructuring process to clearly delink these social services from the
privatized companies. However , such a clear division between economic and social
sectors does not necessarily preclude effective and innovative cooperation between
a local company and the city administration. There has to be a willingness to
assume responsibility on both sides. Both are jointly responsible for creating the
proper framework conditions for the development of an attractive and economically
successful region. Attracting new investors and promoting the diversification of the
local economy are two important ingredients of that process.
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Transforming “Factory Towns”       page 30
Proposition 3 The restructuring of factory towns is in the regional as well as the
national interest.
The success or failure of efforts to transform factory towns has primarily regional
economic implications. As a result, local and regional policymakers and public
administrators have the strongest interest in facilitating a successful restructuring
and modernization process. Yet, the transformation of factory towns should not be
regarded solely as a regional economic policy problem. In many cases, the
Kombinate were the only producers of certain products for the entire nation. In case
the transformation process of such a Kombinat breaks down, there will be
considerable national consequences. Those may include higher unemployment
rates, increased migration flows, or rising poverty levels. In addition, a country may
all of a sudden be dependent on imports of certain products to satisfy domestic
demand. As a result, the management of economic transformation should not only
be the prerogative of regional policy elites. Successful economic transformation is a
fundamental national interest. In particular, national policy elites have to provide the
adequate legal framework for successful economic transformation. This should
include, for example, clearly established property rights.
Transformation cannot be successful without broad-based societal change. Free
markets presuppose free and independent individuals that are able to take
independent (and also self-interested!) decisions. The term speaks for itself: State-
owned enterprises are owned by the state. As a result, the state has to play a critical
role during the privatization and restructuring process.64
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5 Conclusions
Kombinate have had a strong influence on regional economic development in
socialist planned economies such as the GDR. In some cases, the creation of a
Kombinat was the starting point for regional development – as was the case in
Eisenhüttenstadt or in the West German factory town Wolfsburg.65 Under such
circumstances, city and industrial location are one and the same. Even though we
have included a case study of Western Germany, it should be clear that factory
towns are a typical phenomenon of planned economies. Within the Comecon group,
such factory towns were supposed to generate significant economies of scale by
centralizing the production in one geographical location. With the introduction of a
free market system, however, factory towns face a wide range of fundamental
problems. The restructuring and modernization process is particularly difficult and
politically sensitive. In some cases, the economic future of an entire region depends
on the successful implementation of a modernization and restructuring process. Yet,
the same rules apply to the transformation process of factory towns as to all other
formerly state-owned enterprises.
Early on, local policy elites have to become engaged in the transformation process
in order to provide leadership and support. The integration of all stakeholders in the
development of a regional masterplan can facilitate coordinated action and may
nurture strong regional identities. The development of a masterplan also provides an
opportunity to find out whether it makes sense that the local administration should
facilitate the transformation process by financing the modernization of certain parts
of the industrial infrastructure to attract investors. The region itself should diversify
its economy by attracting new companies for a settlement. This way, the one-sided
dependency on the one former Kombinat and its sectoral crises can be reduced.
Economic restructuring and modernization processes are complex. There are no
panaceas. Each case has to be dealt with through a customized package of
reforms. A transparent and honest stock-taking effort should always be the start of
such a transformation process. That stock-taking effort may be painful both for
management as well as employees. However, it is a crucial precondition for the
development of a successful restructuring concept. In addition, the stock-taking
effort in conjunction with the development of a restructuring plan documents for all
those involved what the necessary reform steps will look like, and what they will
mean. The concentration on the core business activities has to form the center of
the rehabilitation plan. Non-essential business activities could be regrouped in new
companies that could serve as suppliers for the core business. This way, they can
diversify their business activities and find other customers. Social services have to
                                                 
65 Wolfsburg – a city of roughly 125.000 – is home of the multinational Volkswagen AG. In 1938, the city of
Wolfsburg was founded as the location for the production of the “true Volkswagen” (KdF-Wagen) by the Nazi
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be provided by the public sector or other parapublic institutions; they cannot remain
in the portfolio of privatized companies.
While the East German Kombinate and state-owned companies were subjected to a
probably unique process of “over-night restructuring,” the implementation of that
process offers much food for thought and perhaps some potential for replication
elsewhere. For Germany, there probably was no alternative to this rather rapid
transformation process – mostly for domestic political reasons. Other countries may
benefit from the German experience in order to find their specific way of
restructuring their factory towns.
 
 
A.B.
Berlin, 2003 
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7 Annexes
Scheme 1: Taxonomy of privatization procedures
Voucher Public
offering
(stock
exchange)
Auction Repriva-
tization
Informal
negotiations
type of contract standard standard standard individual individual
transparency of
procedure
high High high medium low
speed of
privatization
lower Lower fast open open (MBO
faster than
with an
external
investor)
costs of award
procedure
high High medium open low
spread of
proprietary rights
yes Yes no no no
management and
proprietary rights
diverge
yes Yes open open open
purchase price zero High high zero medium
competence of
new owner
low Low high open open
financial
resources of new
owner
low Low high open open
criteria for award nationality,
costs of re-
structuring
costs of re-
structuring
purchase
price
legal claim concept,
competence,
financial
resources,
purchase
price
Source: Dürnhöfer (1998), p. 249.
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Scheme 2: Order of privatization
Source: Derlien et al. (1999), p.8
outsource and
municipalize
social
functions
privatize
energy supply
privatize
infrastructure
installations
outsource services
privatize operational business
segments
Kombinat
private
enterprises
